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A STRATEGY FOR INDUSTRIAL LOCATION WITHIN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)
INTRODUCTION

For our purpose, the paper is divided into five parts, the
first of which deals briefly with the concept of industrial
location and the need for industrial integration and harmoIndustrialization has been widely accepted by both the
nized subregional or regional investment policies. The focus
developed and developing countries as the "centre piece of
of attention in Part II is to highlight some features of the
the development process." The role of industry as a dynamic
pattern of industrial location in ECOWAS member countries.
instrument of growth for the acceleration of economic and
The
analysis proceeded in the third part with a selective
social development is equally underlined by the gusto with
review
of industrial location policy instruments used in three
which the developing countries at the national level strive to
economic integration rou s in the developing countries ,,.
diversify and modernize their economies in favor of in-11
dustries in order to "catch up" with the industrialized V namely, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAETA),
the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the East
countries and achieve a more equitable share of the world
Afrfcan
""Economic Community (EAC). In the light of the
industrial activity.
/
experiences
of the selected integrationgr';ups, Part IV outAt the international level, concerted efforts are being
lines
a
plausible
strategy that could form the basis of action
made to encourage the industrialization of developing counaimed
at
fulfilling
the objective of industrial location in the
tries, with a view to increasing their share in world industrial
West
African
subregion.
production. One of the efforts in this direction is manifested
Perhaps, it is pertinent to mention that the intention here
in the ~ratioo and Plan of Action on Industrial Develop- v
is
not
to present a model strategy or a 'the' solution to the
ment and Cooperation adopted at the second General Concomplex
problem of industrial location. We attempt to idenference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organtify
some
important elements for consideration in the formuization held in Uma, Peru in March 197 5 and endorsed by
lation
of
an
industrial location system in the subregion in the
the United Nations General Assembly 7th Special Session in
hope
that
it
would
stir up some constructive thoughts along a
September 1975 calling inter alia, for increasing the share of
given
path
and
possibly
concretize into positive actions.
developing countries in world industrial production to 25 per
In
this
context,
therefore,
we are fully conscious of the
cent by the year 2000.
considerable
problems
attending
to any proposal of this
To achieve the laudable objective of industrial developnature particularly at the negotiation and implementation
ment, it has been increasingly recognized that concerted
stages. Nonetheless, there is the strong conviction that given
actions at the national, subregional, regional as well as interthe momentum of the political-will that animated the
national levels are indispensable, particularly in the ever inECOWAS, these difficulties are not insurmountable. The
creasing world of inter-dependence. In the process, industrial
paper ends with a recapitulation of the salient points raised
cooperation between the developed and developing countries
and
a discussion of the policy implications of the proposed
as well as among the developing countries constitute a vital
strategy.
element.
Viewed against this very broad background, the formation
of the Economic Community of West African States is a
significant advance in the right direction. With cooperation as
one major pre-requisite for integration in all existing regional
or subregional groups, our main concern in this paper is confined to ways of fostering such cooperation in the field of
industry within the West African subregion. In other words,
and more specifically, this paper attempts to show industrial
cooperation as a device for promoting a more rational or
efficient allocation of resources in the ECOWAS, that is, cooperation as a potent instrument of industrial location. While
it is recognised that industrial location itself is vital in determining costs and benefits of economic integration, no attempt is made to deal with the broader problems of their
'equitable' distribution in the integration process.'

Part I
THE CONCEPT OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
Theoretically, industrial location is a function of the interplay of inter-related economic factors which include the
availability of raw materials, capital, skilled labour, proximity to the market, as well as infrastructure. In practice,
however, other non-economic factors particularly, political
considerations have been very potent in the determination of
the location of industries 1 •
- Based on the theoretical premise, industries wilJ be located in areas with the greatest comparative advantage. Implicit

1
For a detailed consideration of the problems, see UNCTAD: Current problems of economic integration: "The problems of distribution
of benefits and costs and selected corrective measures" TD/ B/5 17
(UN. Publication Sales No. E.75.11.B.10).

1

For a detailed empirical discussion of the influence of these factors in the location of industries in East Africa; see F. I. Nixson,
Economic Integration and Industrial Location: An East African case
study, London, Longman Group Ltd. 1973.
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in this, is that, given the production factor endowment,
countries or areas that are optimal producers of a particular
category of commodities would be the cheapest producers.
However, this trend has invariably led to the polarization of
economic activities with the plants concentrating in a few
areas of a country or countries of a region. Such polarization
is detested both within and between countries and constitutes a serious threat to the stability of any economic grouping. It has therefore been increasingly recognised and accepted that complete reliance on the automatism and unfettered
interplay of market economy forces are insufficient and "inequitable" to direct the decisions of producers and investors,
as such laissez faire situation has neither produced the desired results nor achieved effective international cooperation,
especially in the field of industry.
Thus, to counteract the polarizing tendencies of the free
market forces, deliberate and more dynamic policy measures
at both government and entrepreneurial levels must be
adopted. And to the extent that these are considered necessary at the national level, their application within a regional
or subregional framework becomes more compelling, if only
to ensure and strengthen cooperation among the countries.
In this connection, economic and industrial planning at
the national level has become a basic government policy towards rapid industrial development in both the developed
and developing countries. With national planning being employed to manipulate and reorient the investment process
within a country, regional investment planning and/or
harmonization of investment policies is a prerequisite for a

successful economic integration. However, while not advocating for a system of sub-regional development plans, as we
have at the national levels, because of the inherent problems
involved,1 it is realised that national and sub-regional investment planning cannot be mutually exclusive but can be
complementary.
Apart from the usefulness of regional investment planning
as an equitable distributive mechanism, it serves as a means
for avoiding the duplication of investments in the integrating
area. Furthermore, harmonization of investment policies
particularly, with respect to the attitudes and disposition
towards foreign investment incentives would not only facilitate the inflow of foreign investment but also eliminate unnecessary intra-regional competition to attract fo reign investment. The net result would be a conscious optimal allocation
of the scarce investment resources.
Members of the ECOWAS pursue different investment
policies. In order to illustrate the diverse investment policies
pursued by the member states of the ECOWAS and underline
the need for a common policy one example in this area is
examined. In Table 1, all the selected countries offer direct
tax holidays as an incentive to foreign investments. The dura-

1

Some of the problems associated with regional investment planning include difficulty of obtaining consensus on the choice of location of plants and the direction of investments to agreed locations.
Differences in individual country timing and disposition (centrally
planned economy versus free market economy) to national planning
also constitute formidable obstacles to regional investment planning.

INVESTMENT lNCENTIVES: DIRECT TAX CONCESSIONS AND MAXIMUM
DURATION OF DIRECT TAX BENEFITS IN SELECTED ECOWAS MEMBERS
Direct tax concessions
at establishment'

Duration of direct tax benefits
(number of years)

Maximum
duration of
long-term
tax agreements

Direct tax
holidays at
establishment

Long-term
tax agreement

Benin

X

X

8

13 3

15-20

Ghana

x4

-

-

5s

-

Ivory Coast

X

X

5

-

25-30

Nigeria

X

-

3

-

Senegal

x6

X

-

Country

KEY
X = Yes
- = No

1

Maximum tax
holiday at
establishment

Maximum tax
holiday for
Special projects at
establishment

5,8

7

20

Tax holidays available over a broad range of industrial sectors to investments satisfy ing certain
minimum criteria.

2
Also known as " establishment agreements."
3 Regional development projects.
4
Direct tax concessions limited to a small number of sectors or special circumstances.
5
Capital incentive investments.
6
Concessions limited to a few sectors.
7
Regional development and tourism projects, five years. Agriculture and agri-business projects, eight
years.

SOURCE: Adapted from ECOSOC: National legislation and Regu lations relating to Transnational Corporations

E/C.10/8/Add/ January 1976 p. 4 , Table 6.
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been substantial. Fourthly, most of the industries produce exclusively for their national markets. The implications being
that the plants installed are relatively very small (even for the
small size of the domestic market); they produce under quasimonopolistic, inefficient and high cost conditions within the
protected national markets.
Another characteristic of these industries is that, a good
number of them-as is typical in most developing countriesoperate below capacity 1 . The result of such excess capacity has
been wastage of scarce resources, duplication of plants and
fragmentation of production which ultimately increase costs
of production and the prices of the end product.
Finally, another salient feature of industrial enterprises in
the subregion is the paucity of multinational enterprises2 • The
few existing ones notably the cement project at Onigblo (Benin
Republic) jointly sponsored by Nigeria and Benin Republic
and the Ciments de L'Afrique de L'Ouest (CIMAO) cement
project between Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo with the latter as
host country have largely been due to ad-hoc initiatives of
partner states rather than measures aimed at industrial integration of participants. They are also limited to joint exploitation
and processing of resources possibly to take advantage of
economies of scale and the enlarged markets.
The relative success attending to the establishment of
these projects stem in part, from the small number of participants as well as the limited and specific objectives of the ventures, which require no elaborate commitments on multiple
industrial projects or national industrial policies. Thus, due to
their fewness and the infant nature of the multinational enterprises, they do not have significant impact on the promotion of
economic integration in the West African sub-region.

tion of the direct tax holidays ranges from 3 years in Nigeria
to 8 years in Benin. In addition, a number of the countries
enter into long-term tax agreements with foreign investors
for periods ranging from IO to 30 years. The situation becomes very significant in view of the revelation that such
investment incentives like tax holiday, import duties relief or
exemption and capital depreciation allowances are neither
necessary to attract the investments nor needed to sustain
them. In fact, on the basis of his studies of the issue, one
author declared unequivocally that " my verdict on this tax(tax holiday)- is that it is an unnecessary dissipation of much
needed tax revenue in the countries of West Africa." 1

Part II
SOME FEATURES OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
WITHIN ECOWAS
A simple study of the geographical distribution of industries
in the West African subregion, reveal certain similar characteristics of the industrial centres. Firstly, the industries are far
from being evenly distributed within each country. The industrial locations which form 'growth poles' are made up of
administrative headquarters with large urban populations that
provide ready markets for the products of the industries. They
command relatively more developed infrastructural facilities
such as electricity , water, transport and communications network as well as skilled labour. Some are endowed with important raw materials and/or have easy access to imported or local
raw materials. Such industrial centres include Lagos in Nigeria,
and Accra in Ghana. The disparity in the location of industries
becomes more pronounced when inter-country comparison is
made as the situation is compounded by differences in national
resource endowment and levels of industrial development in
the individual member countries of the region. For example,
industries are concentrated in countries like Nigeria, Senegal,
and Upper Volta with little or nothing in Mali, Niger, Benin and
Mauritania.
The second feature relates to the structures of the industries
in the subregion. The industries are concentrated on the manufacture of non-durable consumer goods involving no highly
sophisticated technology , little capital, with low value added.
The production system is thus characteristic of the incipient
stages of industrialization and the import substitution strategy
adopted by most developing countries. The absence of industries producing basic semi-manufactures (iron and steel, and
heavy chemicals), fertilizers, capital goods (industrial machinery and equipment), and durable consumer goods with greater
linkage effects and requiring inter alia, large markets and capital is conspicuous. Furthermore , the industries in the subregion
produce basically similar products and are more competitive
than complementary to one another. In the circumstance of
competitive investment incentives, to attract industries to individual countries as already noted, the magnitude of tax
revenue forgone by member states of the subregion would have

Part lll
REGIONAL SYSTEMS OF INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION
In this part, we review the mechanisms for industrial location in the regional integration groupings of LAFTA, CACM
and the EAC with a view to learning from the pitfalls of
existing industrial location schemes, thereby serving as a
guide for further exploration of alternative approaches to
industrial location systems in ECOWAS.

Latin Ame.rican Free Trade Area
Background and objectives: The LAFTA, established by
the Treaty of Montevideo on February 18, 1960 comprises
of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador,
1

On the basis of reports and studies, it has been noted that the
rate of capacity utilization of typical industries in developing countries ranges from 35-84 per cent. See UNIDO : Util.ization of Excess
Capacity for Export. The report of the Expert Group Meeting on
Excess Capacity, Rio de Janeiro, March 1969, p. 13.
2
Multinational enterprises as used in this paper refers to enterprises owned jointly by members of ECOWAS and not Trans-national
Corporations. For a list of multinational enterprises in the pipeline
within the sub-region, see P.N.C. OKIGBO: Joint Ventures among
African Countries. TD/ B/ AC.19/ R3 September 1975 Annex I
pp. 1-4.

1

G. A. OGUN POLA: Harmonization of industrial policy in the of
incentives; company taxation and Africanization. Paper presented at
the Conference on ECO~Lagos, in August 1976, p. I 0.
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Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In the field
of industrial integration, the Treaty provides for the conclusion of "complementarity agreements" aimed at promoting vertical and/or horizontal industrial integration in the
region through coordination of industrial plans. Specifically,
Article I 5 of the Treaty states that; "in order to ensure fair
competitive conditions among the Contracting Parties and to
facilitate the increasing integration and complementarity of
their economies, particularly, with regard to industrial production, the Contracting Parties shall make every effort-in
keeping with the liberalization objectives of the present
Treaty- to reconcile their import and export regime, as well
as the treatment they accord to capital, goods and services
from outside the Area." 1 The objectives of the "complementarity agreements" are stated to include:
(i) the creation of adequate conditions for the promotion
of investment in a form which avoids destructive competition;
(ii) facilitation of the programme of sectoral integration
(iii) contribution to the reduction of disparities in the level
of development among the participating countries; and
(iv) stimulation of industrial complementarity under competitive conditions which would ensure that the requirements of quality and price are respected.
Operation: Proposals for complementarity agreements are
formulated through "sectoral meetings" arranged by the
LAFfA secretariat between interested private industrialists
and enterprises, and government officials of member countries.
Under the system, a proposed complementarity agreement
containing the most complete information available must be
submitted to the Permanent Executive Committee of the
LAFfA which in tum advises all other contracting parties.
Negotiation of the agreement which is open to all members can
not be initiated until 45 days after the Committee's receipt of
the proposed agreement. Member states also have the option to
defer negotiations for an additional 60 days. Although the
waiting period is to enable members to study the proposal, it
has the effect of delaying action on the proposals, particularly
if more than one member avail themselves of the option.
After the conclusion of negotiations, the signed agreement
in the form of a protocol is submitted to the Permanent Executive Committee for scrutiny and decision within 30 days as to
its compatibility with the principles and objectives of the
Montevideo Treaty. If approved, the protocol becomes subject
to ratification by the concerned governments before it can be
operative.
As a means for allocating industries in the subregion, the
effectiveness of the system has been noted to be impaired by
the lack of homogeneous policies towards foreign capital and
investments. The agreements have also tended to be competitive in character rather than complementary, as manifested in
the allocation of industries in the chemical and petro-chemical
sectors to nearly all member countries. Furthermore, the

administrative and operational complexity of the system particularly the 'waiting period' added to its ineffectiveness.

The Central American Common Market'
The Agreement on the Regime for Central American Integration Industries signed in Tegucigalpa on June 10, 1958
constitute the main instrument for industrial integration in
the Central American Common Market (CACM).
Objectives: The main objectives of the agreement were to
encourage and promote the establishment of new industries
and expansion of existing ones within the framework of Central American economic integration. Industries requiring
access to the Common Market in order to operate under
reasonable economic and competitive conditions even at minimum capacity are designated integration industries.
Operation: The application for an integrated industry
which could originate from private individuals or corporations
is submitted through their governments to the Secretariat of
Central American Integration Industries Commission (later replaced by the Executive Council). The Commission, with the
aid of the Central American Institute for Research and Technology or competent bodies consider the application on the
basis of technical and economic evaluation of the projects concerned. The agreements are then embodied in protocols forming the legal instrument for their conclusion specifying interalia, the location of the industry, the minimum capacity of
plant and the conditions under which additional plants are to
be subsequently allowed. However, the establishment of an
integration industry requires the concurrence of all the five
member countries but its entry into force and operation is
subject to the deposit of only three instruments of ratification.
Industries are allocated by 'rounds' of negotiations and the
allocation of a second plant within the same branch of industry
to any individual country until each member country has been
allocated a first plant in that branch is not permissible. In
addition to fiscal incentives and preferential government patronage, the Regime provides for free entry into all five member countries for the products of the integration industries
while firms producing similar products that are subsequently
established outside the protocol are accorded such free trade
treatment only after 10 years and through gradual tariff reductions of 10 per cent a year.
The operation of the Regime for Central American Industrial Integration is supplemented by the activities of the Central American Bank of Economic Integration. The Bank is
specifically charged to promote the economic integration and
balanced economic development of the member countries.
Its activities are geared towards meeting the needs of long
term investment projects in industries of a regional character,
infrastructural projects as well as those calculated to create
economic complementarity in the region.
Like the LAFTA scheme, the Regime has been less than
effective. Factors contributing to the ineffectiveness include,
the rudimentary stage of industrialization in the region, lack

1
Quoted from H. BREWSTER: Industrial Integration Systems; in
UNCTAD series, Current Problems of Economic Integration; Agricultural and Industrial Cooperation Among Developing Countries (UN
Publication sales No.E.72 II D.6) p. 69.

1

CACM comprises Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua.

26

As in other systems discussed, it has been generally agreed
that the industrial licensing system has been ineffective. Deficiencies in the Licensing Acts, lack of a common policy for the
treatment of foreign private capital, differences in member
countries' political attitude towards private investment as well
as the dominant influence of political considerations in the
allocation of industries in the region account for the failure of
the scheme. In fact, its abolition was recommended by the
Raisman Commission.
Part IV
PROPOSAL FOR A STRATEGY FOR INDUSTRIES
IN THE ECOWAS

of capital and indigenous entrepreneurship and of course, the
rancour over the ownership and equitable distribution of the
industries.
The East African Community

By the Treaty for East African Cooperation of June 1967,
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania formed the East African Community. The system of industrial allocation in the region is
effected through the Industrial Licensing Acts in the defunct
Kampala Agreement and the relevant provisions of the current Treaty for East African Cooperation.
The Industrial Licensing Acts-a colonial legacy from the
British East Africa era- were to encourage the orderly establishment of new industries to the best advantage of East
Africa as a whole. They were also used as an adjustment
mechanism for equitable distribution of the gains of the integration process. Under the licensing system, now administered by the East African Industrial Council, a given member country is granted exclusive right for a specified period
to manufacture specified articles. Existing, prospective or
potential industries are also eligible for licensing.
An industrial Experts Committee provided for by the
Agreement is charged with the duty of drawing up lists of
'East African Industries' based on two alternative criteria:
(i) Those industries that are economically feasible only with
access to the entire market of East Africa; and
(ii) Those industries that are economically feasible if they
have access to a market larger than that of any country
in East Africa.
Within the broad frame-work of these criteria, the Committee would take into consideration the economic feasibility of
different locations, the need for an equitable territorial distribution of industry and the measures required for achieving
rapidly an equitable pattern of industrial location. Although
the current Treaty for East African Cooperation provides for
the continuation of the industrial licensing system, it forbids
any addition to the schedules of articles thus, in effect, terminating its operation.
The establishment and operation of the East African Development Bank constitute another aspect of the industrial integration system in East Africa. The Bank is inter alia designed:
(i) to provide financial and technical assistance to promote
industrial development of the partner states;
(ii) to give priority in accordance with the operating principles
contained in the charter to industrial development in the
relatively less industrially developed partner states, thereby endeavouring to reduce the substantial industrial imbalance among them; and
(iii) to further the aims of East African Community by financing wherever possible, projects designed to make the
economies of the partner states increasingly complementary in the industrial field.
In addition, the Bank is mandated to invest 22.5 per cent of its
resources in Kenya, 38.7 5 per cent each in Tanzania and Uganda. The operation of the Development Bank being only a
recent development, coupled with its limited scope and resources it has no marked influence on the economic integration
of the region.

Before outlining the proposal for a strategy for the allocation of industries, perhaps, a few comments on the relevant
chapter of the ECOWAS Treaty would be in order. Chapter
V- Articles 29 to 32- of the Treaty is devoted to Industrial
Development and Harmonization and consequently deals
with the issue of industrial integration in the sub-region. In
the Treaty, it is envisaged that the member states would
achieve their industrial development and harmonization in
the following three stages:
Stage I: Exchange of information on major industrial
projects.
Stage II: Harmonization of Industrial incentives and industrial Development plans.
Stage Ill : Personnel Exchange, Training and Joint Ventures.
On this chapter, two fundamental points are discernible. First,
the three stages set out have no time bound. In other words, the
Treaty makes no provision for a time-frame within which each
stage should be undertaken and/or completed. Furthermore,
there is no indication as to whether the three stages are to run
concurrently or consecutively. However, it could be assumed,
that the three stages would follow the evolutionary stages,
earmarked for the complete removal of all trade barriers within
the Community and the adoption of the common external
tariffs, in which case, the first stage would be achieved in two
years, from the entry into force of the Agreement ( I 975-77).
The second stage, 8 years later (1978-1985). The third and
final stage will thus be achieved in the 5-year period 1986-90.
Judging from the rather general nature of the measures
envisaged, there abound little serious obstacles in pursuing
some of them simultaneously. Furthermore, the sequence of
some of the policy measures seem rather haphazard, for
example, according to the Articles of the Agreement, "the
provision of places for training in educational and technical
institutions for Community citizens" would only be undertaken during the last five years (1986-1990) of the 15-year
evolutionary period of the Community.
Second, and more importantly, the Treaty contains no
specific provision for either industrial integration of the
economies of member states or a system of industrial location. There is, however, a reference to the 'acceleration of
industrial integration' of the economies of member states and
this is regarded as a remedial measure- Article 3 2 (1 )-rather
than as a deliberate and consciously planned policy. Implicit
in this, the refore, is that, industrial integration schemes
would be pursued on Ad-Hoc basis and possibly to placate
27

member countries during periodic crisis. Even then, the strategy to be adopted was not spelt ou t in the Treaty and there
is no protocol on industrial location. It has been argued that
if too many details are included in the Treaty, it might be
more difficult to have agreement. Nevertheless the general
nature of the Treaty tended to gloss over important issues
and results in different interpretations.
The proposal for a strategy for industrial location within
the ECOWAS is largely based on the experiences of some
existing economic integration schemes among developing
countries. It is hoped that by strengthening the weak points
of the existing models, learning from their pitfalls and adapting the structure to the peculiar circumstances of the West
African subregion, the chances of success would be greatly
enhanced. Needless to say however, that the success of the
strategy would depend largely on the political will demonstrated by member countries in implementing the proposal.
As already noted, one of the basic factors for a successful
strategy for industrial allocation in the subregion is harmonization or co-ordination of national industrial policies. In this
connection, it is neither sufficient to simply consolidate the
national industrial development plans of member nations nor
would mere "cooperation with one another by exchanging
their (ECOWAS member states) industrial plans" as provided
for in Article 30 paragraph 2 of the Treaty be adequate to
achieve a significant industrial integration of the subregion.
What is required is a permanent multinational Industrial
Planning Committee consisting of intergovernmental officials
of member states to consult regularly from the formulative
to the implementation stages of the national industrial plans.
Private sector participation should also be ensured at all the
stages. The Committee which could be under the auspices of
the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission
provided for in the Treaty, would inter alia, be responsible
for designating integration industries, and suggesting possible
geographical locations on the basis of a combination of the
following criteria:

products of such multinational integration industries would
have exclusive and unrestricted access to the regional market
while temporary tax concessions and fiscal incentives would
be also provided to assist the integration industries.
Once an integration industry is alloted to a member state,
the state would be required to make arrangements to get the
project off the ground within a specified period. However,
other partner states would be required to assist in the establishment of such industry through equity participation. This
would ensure not only the pooling of financial resources and
markets but also risk sharing or spread and long-term interest in
the project. In addition, the non-host country would be able to
share in both profit and management of the enterprise.
Considering the recent trend towards national vis-a-vis
foreign ownership and control of enterprises in developing
countries, the difficulties arising from such national policies
could be mitigated with the provision for the host country to
hold the majority share, (say a minimum of 51 per cent) in
the enterprise while other members and institutions hold the
rest. The shares of the non-host countries would be progressively phased out once the enterprise could stand on its feet.
Another way in which member states could accelerate the
establishment of integration industries would be for all the
member states or participants in the particular project to
provide multilateral guarantee for raising the necessary financial resources in both the local and international capital markets. The assistance of the regional development bank and
financial institutions should also be readily available for the
integration industries. For example, national financial institutions could be enjoined to grant a certain percentage of their
loans to multinational integration projects.
In this context, mention need be made of the role of the
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development as
provided for in the Treaty. According to Article 52 of the
Treaty, the Fund shall inter alia, be used to finance projects
in member states; provide compensation to member states
which have suffered losses as a result of the location of community enterprises; and guarantee foreign investments made
in member states in respect of enterprises established in
pursuance of the provisions of the Treaty on the harmonization of industrial policies.
It would be noted that the provisions of the Treaty were
not explicit enough as to whether, apart from the compensatory role of the Fund, it would be used to finance national or
community projects or both. However, given the size of the
Fund, it would be inadequate to finance both national and
community projects. The Fund could therefore, be assumed
to be intended to finance exclusively integration industries.
Furthermore, if the ability of the Fund to guarantee foreign
investments is directly related to the size of the Fund, its
developmental role would be correspondingly limited. Nonetheless, it is envisaged that the Fund would make positive
contributions under the proposed industrial integration system.
Member states would have complete freedom to establish
industries not included in the integration list. Even in this
field, there is considerable scope for cooperation and coordination among member states, particularly, in the area of
complementary production sharing. Under the system, one

(i) Economies of scale.
(ii) Requirement of a market access larger than available in
one member state.
(iii) The size of capital investment outlay.
(iv) Resource endowment.
(v) Comparative advantage-in terms of cost of production
in different locations.
(vi) Fair distribution of industries among the participating
countries.
The Committee would also monitor the implementation of
the industrial integration agreements as well as review and
adjust the situation as circumstances require. Participation of
all member states of ECOWAS would not be required in each
integration industry but there would be universal consultation before its establishment. The rational being the relative
ease with which a small number of countries could reach
agreement compared with a larger group of countries'. The
1
In his case studies of joint ventures in Africa, P.N.C. OKIGBO
attributed the speed in planning and prospects of rapid implementation of the projects to the limited number of partner countries c.f.
Joint Ventures Among African Countries TD/B/ AC119/ R3.
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Resources Commission charged with the responsibility of identifying, defining and allocating multinational integration industries on the basis of given economic and political criteria. As
already noted, the composition of the Commission would include both government officials and the private sector. Negotiations would be carried out in regular periodic meetings of the
Committee. Although the concurrence of all member states
would be required to designate an integration industry, ratification of the agreement by all member countries would not be
necessary for the establishment and operation of such an industry. Temporary fiscal concessions and incentives would be
extended to the integration industries as well as free entry of
their products in all member countries. The financing of the
allocated industries would be carried out through equity participation by member states, provision of multilateral guarantees by member states as well as through support from the
financial institutions.
Naturally, the proposal has a number of policy implications
chief among which include, the establishment of a permanent
multinational institution-Industrial Planning Committeeand the curtailment of national freedom of action on the establishment of the designated integration industries. The former
relates to the role and authority of the IPC in implementing the
industrial allocation scheme vis-a-vis the national planning
authorities. To the extent that it operates within the framework of a technical and specialised commission as defined in
Article 9 of the Treaty, there might be little room for conflict.
However, for it to be effective and efficient, the necessary
resources and men must be provided. The second issue deals
with national economic sovereignty of member states. As experience has shown, any system of industrial integration that
impinges too heavily, and for a long time on the members
economic sovereignty would encounter formidable odds and
agreement may be difficult to obtain. However, it should be
borne in mind that, both issues do not imply abrogation of
national rights but rather delegation of national authority for
collective actions and decisions in the spirit of cooperation.
In conclusion, we noted that considerable efforts have been
made by various regional groupings towards operating a successful integration industry regime. The apparent lack of success attending to the schemes despite the efforts, underlines
the complex nature of the difficulties involved in the exercise.
Thus, some practical difficulties not presently contemplated
are bound to arise particularly, at the implementation stage of
our proposal. However, within the framework of economic
rationality, the proposed industrial allocation system implemented with some degree of flexibility and backed with the
necessary political will has bright prospects for success.

country would specialize in the production of the components of a final article produced in another member country.
In other words, the products of country A would form part
of the input of the final product produced in country B.
Thus, both countries would benefit from the advantages of
greater specialization and division of labour.
We are aware of the considerable difficulties that would
be encountered in adopting the proposed strategy not only in
defining the integration industries but also at the implementation stage, particularly, the negotiations for the allocation of the listed industries. However, it should be borne in
mind that, to the extent that there is not an "open sesame"
formula to the solution of such problems, the need for consciously planned series of trade offs for the collective interest
of the member states is imperative.

Part V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Thus far, we have highlighted the role and import of industrialization in the social and economic development of both
the developed and developing countries and at the same time
attempted to analyse- albeit briefly- the concept of industrial
location in the process of economic integration. The need for
concerted actions particularly in terms of harmonization of the
hitherto diverse and often times conflicting industrial policies
in the West African subregion was underlined. In the discussion
of some features of industrial location in the subregion, we
noted evidence of uneven distribution of industries not only
between countries but within individual member countries,
and paucity of multinational enterprises geared towards industrial integration of the subregion. Furthermore, the industries
concentrate on the production of non-durable consumer goods
for the small national markets while at the same time they
often operate below capacity. The survey of the experiences of
industrial location mechanisms in three regional economic integration schemes indicates certain similarities. First, provisions for the mechanisms are embodied in the main Treaties
establishing the integration schemes in contrast to the case in
ECOWAS Treaty. Second, the need to take the advantage of
expanded markets and economies of scale looms large in the
definition of the integration industries. Third, despite the encouragement of private sector participation, negotiations have
been intergovernmental affairs and decisions were tilted to
political expediency rather than economics. Finally, each of
the mechanisms has been less than effective in achieving the
stated objectives.
The proposal for a strategy for industrial location within the
framework of similar investment policies and an integrated
ECOWAS has sought to foreclose the pitfalls of the methods in
use in other regions. Essentially, the proposal consists of a
permanent multinational Industrial Planning Committee perhaps, under the aegis of the Industry , Agriculture and Natural
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